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THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IN ZIMBABWE
Lovemore Madhuku
Lecturer, Department of Public Law, Faculty of Law, University of Zimbabwe
INTRODUCTION
The right of workers to strike is probably the most controversial component of labour law. 
It raises complex questions. For instance, is the right to strike a human right? Does an 
individual worker have a right to strike? Should the law create and protect a right to strike? 
The list of questions could be continued ad infinitum. The complexity of the questions are 
compounded by the fact that the issue of a right to strike attracts very strong, and sometimes, 
deeply emotive and ideological views. A leading labour lawyer is often quoted in the 
following words as an example of these strongly expressed views:
There can be no equilibrium in industrial relations without a freedom to strike. In 
protecting that freedom, the law protects the legitimate expectations of workers that 
they can make use of their collective power: it corresponds to the protection of the 
legitimate expectations of management that it can use the right of property for the 
same purpose on its side . . . ’
Such comments are not restricted to academics. Even judges have had occasions to strongly 
defend the right of workers to strike. The celebrated dicta is that of the English judge Lord 
Wright, who noted:
The right of workmen to strike is an essential element in the principle of collective 
bargaining.1 2
A Canadian judge was even more forthright:
. . . the freedom to bargain collectively, of which the right to withdraw services is 
integral, lies at the very centre of the existence of an association of workers. To remove 
their freedom to withhold their labour is to sterilise their association.3
Yet, notwithstanding these strong sentiments in support of the right to strike, workers the 
world over seem to share a common feature: The right to strike is not meaningfully available 
to them whatever the claims to the contrary. With few exceptions, strikes are either 
completely outlawed or severely restricted. This article seeks to examine strike law in 
Zimbabwe in the light of international labour standards and principles of labour law. It is 
sought to be demonstrated that viewed from the angle of the purposes which a modern 
labour law should serve, the current law of strikes in Zimbabwe is both misconceived and 
ridiculous. With this objective, the article will first explore the philosophical justifications 
for a right to strike, to be followed by &n examination of international labour law on the 
subject and thereafter an examination of Zimbabwean law.
1 Per Kahn Freund, quoted in R Davies and M. Freedland, Kahn T round's Labour and The Law, 3rd edition, 
1983 (Stevens & Sons, London) p. 292.
2 Crofter Harris Tweed v Veitch [1942] AC 435 at 463.
3 Per Cameron ] A, Re Retail Wholesale Union and Coot o f Saskatchewan (1985) 19 DLR (4th) 609, at 639.
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JUSTIFICATIONS FOR A RIGHT TO STRIKE
The debate on the issue of the right to strike seems to be premised on the assumption that 
it is "obvious" that there must be recognition of this right in any democratic society.4 
However, a number of specific justifications have been given to support the entrenchment 
of a right to strike for workers in any industrial relations system. First, the right to strike 
has been defended as a fundamental human right.5 On this basis, no more justification is 
required than that applicable to the defence of human rights in general, namely self evident 
rights which accrue by virtue of one being human.6 A right to strike, i f seen as a fundamental 
human right, ought to be part of any civilised community in the same way as the right to 
life, liberty and other common human rights. This justification seems to have been largely 
resisted. It has been said that "there has been reluctance to describe the freedom to strike 
as a right because of a strike's coercive nature and delictual consequences, no other human 
right exists for the explicit purpose of forcing others to do what they do not want to do."7 
Be that as it may, the characterisation of a right to strike as a human right is one of the 
justifications given for insisting on its universal recognition.
Second, the right to strike has been justified on the grounds democracy, it being argued 
that such a right is "intrinsic to the notion of a democracy, a view reinforced by the fact 
that, conversely, it is often banned in totalitarian societies".6
The third justification has been described as the "equilibrium" argument9 and is heavily 
rooted in the concepts that underlie labour law. It is the notion that the withdrawal of 
labour acts as the only effective countervailing force to the power of capital (management) 
to hire and fire. The right to strike is thus seen as creating an "equilibrium" in labour 
relations.10 This equilibrium is seen as essential for the establishment of a properly 
functioning industrial relations system. Of particular note is the fact that this justification 
does not see the "equilibrium" as an end in itself. The equilibrium is seen as a means to 
facilitating collective bargaining, the latter being taken as the cornerstone of modern labour 
law! Put differently, according to this justification, the basic principle of modern labour 
law should be to promote collective bargaining as a means to resolving the inherent conflict 
between labour and capital while at the same time preserving an efficient capitalist system. 
However, collective bargaining cannot work without workers having a right to strike. The 
right to strike is thus supported only in order to promote collective bargaining! The strike 
is "the sanction that impels the parties to bargain collectively".11 This narrow conception 
of a right to strike appears to be the most widely accepted and explains the law of strikes in
4 P. Davies and M. Freedland, crp.cit p. 292 where it is said: "There must be a freedom to strike . . . this 
is obvious".
5 See, Ruth Ben-Israel, International Labour standards: The case o f freedom to strike, Klumcr (1988), Chapter
1 .
6 Sec for instance, the opening paragraphs of the American Declaration of Independence (1776) ". . . 
we hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their 
creator with certain unalienable rights . . ."
7 Alan Pycroft and Barney Jordaan, A Cuide to South African Labour Law, 2nd edition (Juta & Co.) p 271- 
272.
8 Simon Deakin and Gillian S. Morris, Labour Law 1995, Butterworths, p. 752.
9 Ibid, p. 752.
10 See Kahn Freund's statement, op. cit, note 1.
11 MSM Brassey et at, The New Labour Law, 1987 (Juta & Co.), p. 243.
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the United States, United Kingdom and South Africa.12 It also explains strike law in a number 
of European countries.13
The justification given to support the existence and/or protection of the right to strike 
largely shapes the nature and extent of protection given by the law. For instance, the 
"equilibrium" argument as the basis of the law of strikes, makes purely political strikes 
illegal in the United Kingdom and the United States as these are not functional to collective 
bargaining.14 The interim South African constitution does not protect political strikes as it 
only grants the right to strike "for the purpose of collective bargaining".15 In Germany, the 
position has been put more forcefully as follows:
The aim of strikes must be the conclusion of a collective agreement. If they are called 
to achieve goals that cannot be covered in a collective agreement, they are illegal. This 
applies particularly to political or demonstration strikes . . 16
On the other hand, in Italy where the Constitution grants a right to strike on the justification 
of fundamental human rights, some political strikes are lawful.17
It should be clear that the justification given in defence of the right to strike helps one to 
understand the law. It will be shown that the justifications for Zimbabwe's strike law are 
unclear and hence the ridiculous nature of the current law. To streamline the law of strikes 
in Zimbabwe, it will be essential to provide a clear justification for the right to strike which 
can then constitute the basis of the law.
THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IN INTERNATIONAL LABOUR LAW
International labour law refers to the rules of labour law which have been established by 
international law. Its main sources are the legal instruments of the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) and other international and regional human rights instruments. There 
is no ILO Convention dealing specifically with the right to strike. The more obvious 
candidate ILO Conventions, No 87 (On Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right 
to Organise) and 98 (on the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining) do not make any 
specific reference to the right to strike. However, the absence of a specific reference to the 
right to strike in ILO Conventions, does not mean that such a right does not exist in 
International labour law. ILO case law, developed by the Committee of Experts and the 
Committee on Freedom of Association, have derived the right to strike from the concept of 
Freedom of Association as enshrined in Conventions 87 and 98 holding that the right to 
strike is "an intrinsic corollary to the right to organise protected by Convention No. 87" 
and the right to strike is "a legitimate m eans. . .  through which workers may promote and 
defend their economic and social interests".18
12 See generally ibid, pages 241-250. ,
13 See generally Wedderburn, Employment Rights in Britain and Europe (1991), p. 276-353.
14 MSM Brassey, op.cit, pages 241-250.
15 Section 27(4) of the interim South African Constitution.
16 See Gunter Halbach et al, Labour Law in Germany: An Overview, (1992) p. 308, paragraph 125.
17 See R. Birk, "Industrial Conflict: The Law of Strikes and Lock-Outs" in Blanpain R. Comparative Labour 
Law and Industrial Relations, 3rd edition (Kluwor) p. 401 at 415.
18 Freedom o f Association Digest, paras 362 and 363; ILO General Survey by Committee of Experts, 1983 
para 2000; ILO General Survey, 1994, per 148. See also Ruth Ben-Israel, International Labour Standards: 
The Case of Freedom to Strike, (Kluwer), 1988 p. 64-70, and N. Valticos, International Labour Law (Kluwer), 
1979, p. 85, ILO Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining (1994) p. 136.
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The right to strike has therefore become an essential component of International labour 
law through the interpretation work of the Freedom of Association Committee and 
Committee of Experts of the ILO. However, this ILO jurisprudence has also made it clear 
that this right is not absolute and certain restrictions have been admitted. Two restrictions 
recognised by the ILO to the right to strike are in respect of the public service and in essential 
services. As regards the public service, the ILO has admitted prohibition of the right to 
strike only to public servants "acting in their capacity as agents of the public authority"19 
and this should only cover top civil servants. In respect of "essential services",20 the ILO 
accepts that strikes may be prohibited or restricted in them. It defines "essential services" 
as those "interruptions of which would endanger the life, personal safety or health of the 
whole or part of the population."21 However, whenever the right to strike is prohibited or 
restricted in the recognised categories, the ILO insists on the provision of compensatory 
mechanisms such as reference of disputes to compulsory arbitration.22
Apart from ILO jurisprudence, the right to strike is recognised in other international 
instruments. It is guaranteed in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (1966) provided it is exercised in conformity with the laws of the particular country.23 
The European Social Charter of 1961, recognises "the right of workers and employers to 
collective action in cases of conflict of interest, including the right to strike, subject to 
obligations that might arise out of collective agreements previously entered into."24 The 
European Community Social Charter of 1989 provides that "the right to resort to collective 
action . . .  shall include the right to strike".25 Given ILO jurisprudence which has derived a 
right to strike from the very essence of freedom of association, it is arguable that many 
other international instruments' protection of freedom of association impliedly covers a 
right to strike. Although the effect of this argument is uncertain, it would cover the African 
Charter on Human and People's Rights,26 the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,27 the International Covenant of Civil and 
Political Rights28 and the American Convention on Human Rights.29
It must be clear from the foregoing examination of International labour law that the right 
to strike is overwhelmingly recognised although its exact limits may be uncertain. It now 
remains to examine strike law in Zimbabwe in the light of this international legal regime.
STRIKE LAW IN ZIMBABWE
Constitutional Protection for the Right to Strike?
The Constitution of Zimbabwe is the supreme law of the country and any law inconsistent 
with it is void.30 If a right to strike were to be derived from the Constitution, any purported
19 Freedom of Association Digest, para 393.
20 Ibid, para 394.
21 Ibid paras 394 and 400; General Survey 1983 para 214.
22 ILO: Official Bulletin Vol LXXVI, 1993, series' B, No. 1, Case No 1620 (Colombia).
23 Article 8.
24 Article 6.
25 Article 13.
26 Article 10 (1).
27 Article 11(1) and 11(2).
28 Article 22(1), (2) and (3).
29 Article 16(1), (2) and (3).
30 See Section 3 of the Constitution and the Supreme Court's emphatic embracing of the implications of 
this provision in Ian Douglas Smith v Mutasa N.Oand Another 1989 (3) ZL.R 183.
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prohibition or restriction of it in labour legislation would be void. The problem, however, 
is that the Constitution of Zimbabwe does not specifically incorporate a right to strike. But 
this is not the end of the matter. It is arguable that the Constitutional protection of the 
freedom of association and assembly enshrined in Section 21 could cover a right to strike. 
Section 21(1) provides:
Except with his own consent or by way of parental discipline, no person shall be 
hindered in his freedom of assembly and association, that is to say, his right to assemble 
freely and associate with other persons and in particular to form or belong to political 
parties or trade unions or other associations for the protection of his interests.
The issue which arises is: What is the exact content of a freedom to "form and belong to 
trade unions . . .  for the protection of his interests"? Put differently, what right or freedom 
is there to belong to a trade union if the latter has no right to strike?
On one view, the freedom to join and participate in trade union activities necessarily includes 
the right to strike. There are two sources of support for this view. The first is ILO 
jurisprudence already referred to which has derived a right to strike from Freedom of 
Association. The second support comes from the Canadian case of Re Retail Wholesale Union 
and Govt, o f Saskatchewan31 which held that provincial legislation banning collective 
bargaining and strikes was unconstitutional as it infringed the freedom of association of 
workers protected by Section 2(d) of the Canadian Charter (Constitution). The essence of 
this decision is that freedom of association is meaningless if the activities of the association 
are not thereby protected. To remove the right to strike from an association of workers is to 
"sterilise their association"31 2 thereby denying them the freedom of association.
Although this is an attractive approach it has been demolished even in Canada itself. The 
Canadian Supreme Court has ruled that the right to strike cannot be derived from a mere 
right to associate as the latter does not only exist for trade unions.33 345This position follows 
an earlier common law position adopted by the Privy Council in Collymore v Attorney 
GeneraP* which held that the right to strike could not be derived merely from freedom of 
association since trade unions have other activities apart from strikes and collective 
bargaining.
The position in Zimbabwe has not been tested in the Supreme Court. While it is clear that 
the present position of the courts in England and Canada is to flatly refuse to derive a right 
to strike from mere freedom of association, there is merit in the 1LO approach. In principle, 
the right to strike is the raison d'etre of trade unionism in so far as it represents the ultimate 
exercise of collective power. It should therefore be regarded as the essence of freedom of 
association of workers. It is therefore submitted that a right to strike can competently be 
derived from the freedom of association provisions of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. At 
the very least the question whether the Constitution of Zimbabwe protects a right to strike 
should now be regarded as open in the light of the above discussion.
In South Africa3^ and Malawi, the Constitutions specifically enshrine some right to strike. 
The Malawian Constitution however, vaguely enshrines the right as follows: "The state
31 (1985) 19 DLR (4th) 609.
32 Cameron J A, at p. 639.
33 Alberta Union o f Provincial Employees v Attorney-General of Alberta (1987) referred to in Wedderburn op. 
cit. p. 147-148.
34 [1970] AC 538 (PC).
35 Section 27(4) of the Interim Constitution.
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shall take measures to ensure the right to w ithdraw ".36 The actual effect of these 
constitutional provisions remains to be seen, but the difficulties experienced in Zimbabwe 
at the very outset are avoided in these countries. Outside South Africa, constitutional 
entrenchment of the right to strike is not unknown.37
Whatever the constitutional position of the strike in Zimbabwe, it is now clear that workers 
on strike or participating in a demonstration have a constitutional right to peaceful assembly 
and movement without interference from the state.38 In particular, no prior permission 
from the state is necessary for workers to demonstrate or assemble in public as such a 
demonstration is a facet of the freedom of expression and assembly enshrined in the 
Constitution.39
RIGHT TO STRIKE IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE IN ZIMBABWE
Zimbabwe has a two-tiered labour law system which makes a distinction between 
government workers and other workers. Government workers have their terms and 
conditions of employment regulated by a mechanism set up directly by the Constitution. 
The Labour Relations Act40 which applies to all other workers, makes it clear that it does 
not apply to workers "whose conditions of employment are otherwise provided for by or 
under the Constitution".41 The Constitution creates two main groups of Government 
workers. The first group is called the "Public Service" which is administered by a 
constitutionally entrenched Public Service Commission42 operating in terms of the Public 
Service Act.43 The second group consists of other special groups outside the "Public Service" 
such as the police, the army, the prison service and the judiciary and these are governed by 
specific Acts of Parliament enjoined by the Constitution.
Whichever group of government workers one is referring to, there is no provision for the 
right to strike. In the police force resort to a strike may constitute several offenses such as 
desertion, insurbordination or "being absent without leave".44 These offenses may lead to 
imprisonment of up to five years. More serious offenses are created for the army.45 Thus 
outside the 'public service' group of government workers, the question of a right to strike 
is a non-issue — the law makes the strike unthinkable. It may be remarked that a blanket 
prohibition of the right to strike in the police and army is permitted by ILO standards 
given that Convention 87 upon which the right to strike is founded, does not apply to the 
police and the army.
In the "public service" the absence of a provision of a right to strike, means that in the 
absence of a constitutional protection there is no right to strike at all. The absence of a 
statutory right to strike effectively means there is a blanket prohibition of strikes in the 
public service regardless of the nature of the job or its scope in relation to the exercise of
36 Section 31 (4).
37 For instance, the Right to Strike is constitutionally entrenched in Italy, France, Spain, Portugal and 
Greece, see R. Birk, op. cit, page 409.
38 See In Re Munhumeso 1995 (2) BCLR 125.
39 Ibid.
40 Chapter 28:01.
41 Section 3.
42 Sections 74 and 75.
43 Chapter 16:04.
44 See section 29 (read with the schedule) of the Police Act (Chapter 11:10).
45 See Defence Act (Chapter 11:02), First Schedule.
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governmental authority. What matters is whether or not one falls into the "public service" 
as defined by the Public Service Act.46 If one is covered by the definition, cadit quaestio — 
there is no right to strike.
As already indicated such a blanket prohibition of strikes in the entire public service is 
contrary to international labour law. ILO jurisprudence has only allowed prohibitions in 
those cases where the public servants either exercise governmental authority or are in an 
"essential service". Only top civil servants can be said to exercise governmental authority 
and a substantial number of civil servants are not in "essential services" for purposes of 
strike law.
It is difficult to understand why the law has taken this draconian approach to strikes in the 
public service. It is perhaps instructive to note that labour relations in the public service in 
Zimbabwe is characterised by this heavy handed approach. While public servants may 
join workers' organisations of their choice, these have no entitlement to be recognised by 
government as worker representatives. There is no scope for the registration and recognition 
of trade unions in the public service. The Public Service Act leaves it to the Minister to 
recognise an organisation of workers at his/her sole discretion.47 The only reason for 
recognition of an organisation of workers is for purposes of "consultations"48. There is no 
collective bargaining in the public service. Terms and conditions of employment are 
determined by the Public Service Commission in consultation with the Minister of Labour.49 
Workers have neither the right to strike to influence the content or nature of these terms 
and conditions of employment nor the entitlement to engage in collective bargaining to 
improve the conditions.
It must be apparent that this state of affairs is unjust and probably inhuman. In a civilised 
community, it hardly needs to be emphasized that human beings cannot be treated like 
machines with no say whatever in regulating their employment conditions. The situation 
becomes more unfair when it is noted that the same government has granted collective 
bargaining and strike rights to private sector workers governed by the Labour Relations 
Act. The position in the public service not only offends international labour standards but 
also undermines the human rights dimensions of the right to strike.50
The law also seems to be based on a misconception. It appears clearly based on the thesis 
that the state as an employer cannot be subjected to the same pressures as private employers. 
The executive arm of government, even as an employer, is said to be "answerable only to 
the legislature and its right to act unilaterally should not be challenged or trammelled by 
particular interest groups such as trade unions".51 Further, public servants have been seen 
as representatives of sovereign power52 and cannot therefore, through a strike, be in conflict 
with themselves. These bases for the denial of a right to strike have largely been demolished. 
It is being realised that merely describing a strike as illegal does not prevent it from 
occurring. Zimbabwe has just learnt it the hard way with the civil servants strike in August/ 
September 1996 and government health workers strike in October-December 1996. The
46 See section 14.
47 See section 24.
48 See section 20.
49 See section 19.
50 See above on justifications for the Right to Strike.
51 Morris and Freedman, "Is there a Public/Private Labour Law Divide?" Comparative Labour Law Journal 
2993, p. 115 at 117.
Ibid p 117.52
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better approach is for government to establish for the public service, the same labour 
relations system as that in the private sector, thus giving government workers such rights 
as collective bargaining and a right to strike (subject to limitations). Zimbabwe has examples 
to follow even as near home as Southern Africa, where some countries such as South Africa,53 
Malawi,54 Zambia55 and Namibia56 grant these rights to government workers.
The absence of a right to strike clearly means that failure to report for work in pursuance of 
a strike objective amounts to a breach of contract under the common law.S7 This would 
entitle the employer under the common law to summary dismissal. However, government, 
being a public authority cannot just exercise this common law power to dismiss strikes 
without following the principles of natural justice. Thus in Zimbabwe Teacher's Association 
and Others v Minister o f Education and Culture,58 government's purported mass dismissal of 
striking teachers who had defied its orders to return to work was held by the High Court 
to be unlawful. The basis of the decision was that government had breached the audi alteram 
partem rule in not giving each teacher an opportunity to be heard before being fired. It was 
held further that talking to the worker organisations was not the same as talking to each 
teacher.
The Public Service Commission has promulgated regulations governing its exercise of the 
power to dismiss striking workers but these do not oust the audi alteram partem rule.59 
However, apart from this rule, there is no other protection of strikers in the public service.
RIGHT TO STRIKE OUTSIDE THE PUBLIC SERVICE
The legislation governing labour law outside government employment is the Labour 
Relations Act (Chapter 28:01). This Act applies even where, as in the case of public 
authorities, there is legislation regulating that public authority unless there is clear provision 
to the contrary.60
The Act provides for a right to resort to industrial action in a manner wider than merely 
providing for a right to strike. The relevant provision is section 104(1) which reads:
subject to this Act, all employees, workers committees and trade unions shall have 
the right to resort to collective job action for the redress of lawful grievances.
"Collective job action" is defined in section 2 as:
an industrial action calculated to persuade or cause a party to an employm ent 
relationship to accede to a demand related to employment, and includes a strike, 
boycott, lock-out, sit-in or sit-out, or other such concerted action.
A strike is thus merely one of many forms of industrial action purportedly protected. This 
makes any attempt at defining what exactly constitutes a strike largely academic as almost 
every form of industrial action is covered by the definition of "collective job action". In
53 South Africa's Labour Relations Act, No 66 of 1995.
54 Malawi Labour Relations Act, 1996.
55 Zambia's Industrial and Labour Relations Act, 1993.
56 Namibia's Labour Act, 1992.
57 R v  Smil 1955 (1) SA 239 (c); NTE Ltd v SACWU 1990 (2) SA 499(N); NUMSA v Vetsak Co-operative Ltd 
2991 1LJ 564.
58 1990 (2) ZLR 48(H).
59 See Public Service (Maintenance of Service) Regulations, 1990.
60 See Gumbo v Norton-Selous Rural Council 1992 (2) ZLR 403(S).
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other countries, the definition of a "strike" is significant because it is only the strike which 
is protected and not other forms of industrial action.61 In Zimbabwe, the definition of a 
strike itself should be regarded as legally immaterial. However, out of abundance of caution, 
it is suggested that the Act only contemplates a strike as a complete cessation of work to 
distinguish it from the other forms of industrial action.
There are a number of aspects to note about the right to strike as enshrined in section 
104(1). First, it is a collective right and not an individual right. The right is granted to 
"employees . . ." and not an "employee". As such, an individual worker cannot exercise 
the right to strike enshrined in the Act. Second, unlike in other countries, such as Germany 
and Sweden where a lawful strike can only be organised by a trade union,62 the Zimbabwean 
Act recognises the right to strike even by unorganised workers, as long as they are 
"employees".
Third, a political strike, in the sense of a strike not directed at the employer but at government 
or other public authority for changes to policies or law, is not covered by the Act. This is so 
because the definition of "collective job action" requires industrial action to be directed to 
a party to an employment relationship and that the demand be "related" to employment. 
The conservative courts in Zimbabwe are not likely to interpret "related" in such a way as 
to cover a political strike directed at labour policies.
Fourth, it would appear that picketing is covered. Picketing "refers to the attempts by 
workers engaged in an industrial dispute:
(i) to persuade others in that workplace to take their side in the dispute;
(ii) to deter others (known as scab labour) from taking the jobs vacated by the striking 
workers;
iii) to communicate the grievance to the public;
(iv) to persuade or pressurise customers not to enter the workplace;
(v) to disrupt deliveries and pick-ups to and from the workplace".63
The definition of "collective job action" incorporates "other such concerted action" and it 
is submitted that picketing is clearly such concerted action.
Fifth, sympathy strikes do not appear covered. "A sympathy strike is a strike in a workplace 
other than the one where the dispute exists in an attempt to force an employer to settle the 
dispute."64 The definition of "collective job action" seems to suggest that the strike should 
be directed to "a party to an employment relationship" and it may be regarded absurd by 
a conservative judiciary to suggest that this covers anybody in an employment relationship.
Sixth, the right to strike is made subject to the restrictions (and they are many) in the Act. It 
is these restrictions which have made the law on strikes ridiculous.
RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHT TO STRIKE
There are two circumstances where the Act places no restrictions whatsoever on the right 
to strike and these are where workers wish to avoid an occupational hazard65 and in "defence
61 See generally, R. Birk, op cit note 17 p. 405.
62 Ibid, p. 404.
63 A. Pycroft and B. Jordaan, op.cit, note 7 p. 289.
64 Ibid, page 289.
65 Section 104(4)(a}.
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of an immediate threat to the existence of a workers committee or a registered or certified 
trade union".66 It is not clear what this latter phrase exactly entails, and it is suggested that 
imaginative trade unions can use it to call for a strike. For instance, is an employer refusing 
to engage in collective bargaining not constituting a threat to the existence of a trade union? 
What of the employer who fires (lawfully or unlawfully) both the chairman and secretary 
of a worker's committee? It is submitted that there is merit in arguing that each of these 
circumstances may constitute an "immediate threat" as contemplated by the Act. If this be 
so, that could open a way in which some strikes may finally be legal in Zimbabwe.
Apart from the above two circumstances, the Act places heavy restrictions on the right to 
strike.
The first restriction relates to "essential services". Employers engaged in an essential service 
have no right to strike at all. "Essential service" is defined so widely as to cover virtually 
every industrial activity in Zimbabwe. This is in section 102 where it is said to cover services 
relating to generation, supply or distribution of electricity, fire brigade or fire service, any 
health services, any communications service and so on.67 In addition to the listed service, 
the Minister of Labour is given power to declare further essential services.68
This definition of essential services is unreasonably wide and makes one wonder why it 
was ever necessary to proclaim the right to strike in the first place. The additional powers 
given to the Minister can be exercised even where a strike has already broken out, thus 
making even these strikes that may escape the net to be subsequently made illegal.
It is suggested that the determination of what constitutes an "essential service" be 
democratised and the tripartite social partners be involved in delineating those services. 
In South Africa, for instance, the new Labour Relations Act creates a tripartite committee 
for the determination of essential services. Such an approach will cut down the very wide 
and ridiculous ambit of the definition of "essential service"/’9
The second restriction is that workers may not resort to a strike before referring the dispute 
to a labour relations officer.70 This restriction should be discussed together with the third 
restriction, which says that there is no right to strike if the dispute has been dealt with by 
a labour relations officer or other institution in terms of Part XII of the Act.71 Now, it is 
inconceivable that a dispute compulsorily referred to the dispute settlement machinery of 
the Act will end without being determined in order to open a way for resort to strike 
action. Invariably, any dispute referred to the machinery in Part XII of the Act will be 
"determined or disposed of" thereby leaving no room for a strike at all. These two 
restrictions clearly make the right to strike in the Act meaningless.
The fourth restriction is that there can be no strike where a matter is governed by an 
unexpired collective bargaining agreement.
The cumulative effect of the provisions on "essential services" and the second and third 
restrictions above, is to virtually create no room for a legal strike. Either one is an essential 
service and that is the end of the matter or the dispute has to be referred to the machinery 
in Part XII and thus closing the route to a lawful strike.
66 Section 104 (4)(b).
67 See the list in section 102 (a)-(g).
68 Section 102 (h).
69 Section 70 of SA Labour Relations Act, No. 66 of 1995
70 Section 104 (3) (a)(ii).
71 Section 104 (3) (a)(iii).
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Even where, in the unlikely event that a strike has broken out, the Act gives the Minister 
the power to order a stop to the strike by issuing what is called a show cause order72 asking 
the workers involved to defend the continuity of the strike. Pending that defence, the strike 
is illegal. At the hearing of the show cause order a disposal order ending the strike may be 
issued.* 73 The Supreme Court, has recently held that only the Minister can issue a show 
cause order.74 The Act requires the giving of notice fora strike o f! 4 days and this facilitates 
a show cause order.
It is precisely for this fact of giving a right to strike by one hand, and almost completely 
taking it away by the other, which makes the law of strikes in Zimbabwe ridiculous and 
misconceived. It reveals a lack of a well founded justification for the right to strike. If the 
right to strike had been granted on some belief or justification, the law would have made 
every effort to make it realistic. For instance, the very wide definition of "collective job 
action" which protects some forms of industrial action not protected in other industrial 
relations systems is rendered a laughing stock when it is realised that none of that industrial 
action can ever be legal in Zimbabwe.
There is another feature worth exploring. An illegal strike would certainly lead to a breach 
of contract under the common law entitling the employer to summarily dismiss. But the 
power of summary dismissal has now been curtailed by SI 371/85. Thus, even where 
workers have resorted to an illegal strike, the employer still has to apply for permission to 
dismiss them. The High Court has held that an illegal strike is conduct inconsistent with 
the fulfilment of the terms of a contract contrary to Section 3 (1 )(a) of SI 371 /85 (See Wholesale 
Centre v Mehlo & Ors 1992 (1) ZLR 376 and Kadoma Magnesite v RHO 1991 (1) ZLR 283. 
Given the principle in Masiyiwa v T M  Supermarkets 1990 (1) ZLR 166, the Labour Relations 
Officer has to dismiss. What is not clear is the effect of a legal strike on the employment 
contract. The Act does not specifically address this issue. It is submitted that a legal strike 
merely suspends the employment contract and does not terminate it otherwise there will 
be no point in providing for a right to strike.75 Suspension of the employment contract 
means the employer is not liable to the payment of wages for the period of the strike.
One strange feature of the right to strike in the Act, which also explains why it is ridiculous, 
is that there is no apparent link between the strike weapon and collective bargaining. 
Workers in essential services can not go on strike and that is the end of the matter for them. 
Workers in non-essential services will have to refer the deadlock to a labour relations officer 
and as already indicated, this closes any route to a strike. Effectively, the right to strike has 
not been conceived as a weapon to facilitate collective bargaining and this is difficult to 
understand. As shown in the opening pages of this article, one of the main justifications 
for a right to strike is to create an "equilibrium" which will facilitate effective collective 
bargaining. The result of the lack of a deliberate link between the right to strike and collective 
bargaining is a legally meaningless right to strike, hence the resort to illegal strikes.
Another disturbing feature of the Act is that although it grants trade unions and workers 
committees immunity from civil liability, it creates criminal sanctions for any breach of the 
provisions of the law. Thus, an illegal strike constitutes a criminal offence.76 To this, one 
may only need to refer to the following learned observation:
72
73
74
75
76
Section 106.
Section 107.
Cargo Carriers (Private) Limited v Robert Zambezi and others SC 82/06.
See generally R. Birk, op.cit, p. 401 FF.
Section 112.
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The time has come to dispense with criminal regulation of industrial relations. The 
criminal law is a crude instrument of social control. Often it is more a matter of social 
retribution than an effective deterrent. However effective it might be in deterring other 
types of social behaviour, it has failed to inhibit strikes.77
CONCLUSION
The right to strike is a critical feature of labour law. Zimbabwe's strike law breaches 
international labour standards both as regards government and non-government 
employees. The purported right to strike granted by the Labour Relations Act is largely 
meaningless and ridiculous. One most probable reason for this is that the strike provisions 
of the Act are not premised on some deliberately conceived purpose of strike law in 
industrial relations. For instance, a deliberate policy to promote collective bargaining would 
see more meaningful and realistic provisions of the law. It is therefore suggested that a 
clear justification for the right to strike be mapped out for a meaningful strike law regime 
to be established. Whatever the framework to be established in Zimbabwe, it should be 
clear that a right to strike is an indispensable component of any democratic and civilised 
society.
77 Brassey et al, crp.cit, p. 252.
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